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I. INTRODUCTION 
In particular, this paper discusses how data could affect copyright and 
competition law. We shall begin with an overview of recent developments in 
the intersection of data, competition law, and privacy regulations in order to 
establish some common principles in the subject. Then we shall consider 
some scenarios from the film and entertainment industries and how they 
might interact more with such laws and regulations in the near future. In 
 .  
1. audience data became the primary driver of content 
production and distribution decisions; and  
2. content produced by AI and deep learning 
algorithms became the norm? 
While these scenarios are necessarily speculative, we shall try to 
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II.  BACKGROUND ON AI, DATA AND COMPETITION LAW 
The popular image of Artificial Intelligence is a robot-like C-3PO or 
Data from Star Trek, or a sinister computer-like SkyNet or HAL 9000. In 
reality, the term has been used to refer to a variety of programming 
techniques symbolic computation and expert systems in the 1980s or 
statistics-driven deep learning algorithms of today. The vast majority of 
applications of artificial intelligence today are based on statistics, and that 
consists of families of algorithms that take the data as input and produce as 
ou
going into technical details (and possibly by abusing analogies), these 
algorithms can be thought of as a form of compression: films, pictures, text 
messages, or other sources are represented in computers as the bits and bytes 
that make up data. These algorithms (and this paper will use the term 
-learning 
model, or implementation thereof) try to extract a smaller set of numbers that 
go into a formula to perform whatever AI task the programmer was trying to 
achieve. In effect, they 
to whatever task the programmer had in mind. The effect of this is that many 
tasks that knowledgeable, trained humans would have performed can be 
replaced by these algorithms. Through the data, and metadata that humans 
the knowledge economy and promise to accelerate economic growth in the 
same way the Industrial Revolution accelerated it when it replaced physical 
human labor with machines.  
Just as the Industrial Revolution led to a few companies accumulating a 
monopoly through these machines and triggered modern anti-trust 
legislation, there is fear that the accumulation of data would allow new 
monopolies to form and must be regulated with a new perspective on 
competition law. Competition and antitrust regulation come from an unholy 
mix of politics, economics, and law. European regulators have been the 
keenest on regulating the use and collection of data from both the 
perspectives of competition and data privacy, which we illustrated in the 
following short, abbreviated timeline: 
1. 2014 Directorate-General for Competition of the 
European Commission approves Facebook/WhatsApp 
merger without condition.1 
 
1  European Commission Press Release IP/14/1088, Mergers: Commission Approves Acquisition 
of WhatsApp by Facebook (Oct. 3, 2014). 
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2. 2016 EU Commissioner Vestager gives a speech 
acknowledging the relevance of data to competition 
law.2 French and German competition authorities 
publish a joint report on big data.3 
3. 2017 EU Commission carries out dawn raids as part 
of an investigation into alleged agreements by Polish 
banks to withhold data from Fintech rivals.4 UK 
competition authority establishes Data team.5 
4. 2018 GDPR comes into force.6 
5. 2019 EU Commission President suggests that the 
7 
Arguably these latest developments illustrate how political competition 
law can become: The EU is said to be motivated by fear of large American 
opportunity in Brexit to establish itself as the leader in the field, and even 
major US Presidential candidates see a political opportunity in expanding the 
regulation of data. But this timeline also illustrates some principles that we 
shall see in our scenarios: 
 Both firms (e.g., the Polish bank) and regulators (e.g., in 
the Facebook/Whatsapp deal) see data-drive as a 
defensive barrier to future competition. 
 While algorithms are generally regarded as 
commodities, regulators see that they have a potential 
for misuse.  
 
2  Margrethe Vestager, Executive Vice President for the European Union Commission for a Europe 
Fit for a Digital Age, (Sep. 29, 2016), https://wayback.archive-
it.org/12090/20191129222113/https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/big-data-and-competition_en. 
3  AUTORITE DE LA CONCURRENCE & BUNDESKARTELLAMT, COMPETITION LAW AND DATA (May 
10, 2016), 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%20Data%20Papier.pdf. 
4  European Commission Memo/17/3761, Antitrust: Commission Confirms unannounced 
Inspections Concerning Access to Bank Account Information by Competing Services (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_3761. 
5  Stefan Hunt, CMA s New DaTA Unit: Exciting Opportunities for Data Scientists, GOV.UK (Oct. 
24, 2018), https://competitionandmarkets.blog.gov.uk/2018/10/24/cmas-new-data-unit-exciting-
opportunities-for-data-scientists/. 
6  2016 O.J. (L119/1) 99. 
7  See Etienne Bassot, -2024, EUR. 
PARLIAMENTARY RES. SERV. (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/646148/EPRS_BRI(2020)646148_EN.pdf. 
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 The accumulation of data is creating new fronts for 
regulators to protect rights, especially the right to 
privacy (GDPR). 
With these three principles in mind, let us consider the first scenario.  
III.   AUDIENCE DATA BECAME THE PRIMARY DRIVER OF 
CONTENT DISTRIBUTION AND PRODUCTION DECISIONS? 
The question suggests a notion of content producers collecting esoteric 
data on its audiences from what portions of a piece of content they fast-
forward through or to their facial expression while watching the same to 
produce content specifically designed to be more engrossing. Those data 
points are important, and we shall return to them. But in reality, data-driven 
content decisions could appear much more innocuous to viewers while being 
no less fraught with subtle competition issues. The idea of data-driven 
content production entered mainstream thought when Netflix announced that 
its decision to greenlight House of Cards came from a data-driven model. 
The misconception was that the IP (script, plot, et cetera) was generated by 
algorithms. In actuality, the IP behind House of Cards had existed decades 
before as a British television show in the 1990s and as a book before that. 
The difference is how Netflix decided to greenlight the content.8 Television 
and film productions involve a significant investment of capital, and any 
investor must do their due diligence before proceeding. Therefore, each piece 
of potential content undergoes a financial analysis. Investors are inherently 
risk-averse, a
explains why Hollywood is more likely to back a well-known director as well 
as why they produce so many franchises and sequels. Franchises and sequels 
have an existing fan-base and a solid set of demographic and marketing data 
from which they can extrapolate. It is not too difficult to imagine a world 
where investors require all such decisions to undergo a data-driven financial 
analysis. Indeed, the promise of more reliable, consistent returns on 
investments would be hard to pass up, especially if it could be demonstrated 
that the data-driven approach could deliver. We can extrapolate from current 
times to imagine what this future greenlighting process could look like: 
Financiers would demand data 
-watching habits and 
expendable income) before any production funds would be made available. 
Because data has such strong network effects, the relevant data would most 
 
8  Articles like David Carr s Giving Viewers What They Want, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/business/media/for-house-of-cards-using-big-data-to-guarantee-
its-popularity.html, appear to contradict what I am saying. I ask the readers to trust me on this point as I 
worked in the industry during this time and shared a panel discussion with a Netflix executive in 2014. 
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likely accumulate in one or two large firms. A firm that gets better at 
providing data for accurate underwriting is likely to see its content funded 
more frequently, thus acquiring more audience data. Data would become a 
, allowing it to underwrite and fund content 
production and depriving other firms of the opportunity. So, a lack of 
regulation on the accumulation of data or its use for such decisions could lead 
 ability to 
produce content.  
It could be argued that this would not be bad for consumers. But one 
must also consider the sort of content for which this data would be available. 
, such content means sequels and franchises, 
s -
acquire the data necessary to conduct a financial analysis, but few firms 
would be able to acquire the rights to the underlying material. This would 
 
A.  Content Distribution 
Content production is only one side of the coin. The other major 
influential business process for the film and TV industries is content 
distribution. This side of the business tries to best answer the questions of 
when to release content, where to release content, and over which media. 
When it comes to the question of when content is distributed, film content 
distribution is already data driven. Your author has first-hand experience in 
establishing model
attention in particular jurisdictions and using the algorithms to suggest the 
most financially optimal release date. But the questions of where and how 
are more complicated. To understand this, we must first discuss how film 
distribution works. The structure of cinema distribution in the US was 
established by the Hollywood Antitrust Case of 1948 that separated the 
operation of cinemas from film studios.9 As a consequence, US film 
producers have had an indirect relationship with their audiences and 
distribution decisions have been largely driven by gut feeling (for dates) or 
personal relationships (cinema pricing). This setup is mostly followed around 
the world with the notable exceptions of France and South Korea, where 
studios and distributors are vertically integrated. As a consequence, cinemas 
and film distributors have a frequently antagonistic relationship. Distribution 
companies (major studios) have to convince cinemas to carry their content, 
an
negotiated weekly per piece of content. So, film distributors are competing 
 
9  See generally U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
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against each other for screen space and are bidding against each other via the 
rental price. The consumers are not the audience, but the exhibitors. And a 
decision about where to release a film becomes a decision about how much 
to bid in a particular cinema. A data-driven distribution strategy means that 
distributors and exhibitors would need data on the local demographics 
(including personal data as described before, perhaps acquired via loyalty 
programs with the cinema, which we already see today), along with data on 
the other local 
and distributors to book the most optimal screens for the most optimal films, 
both would need to rely on the same dataset. This dataset would need to be 
consumed by an algorithm that would then suggests the optimal booking. At 
first glance this would sound as though it would eliminate anti-competitive 
behavior especially price collusion. But datasets can be inherently, or even 
purposely, biased, and algorithms are black boxes that can disguise nefarious 
uses. Even before the advent of big data, as early as the 1990s, it was already 
established that it would be difficult for regulators to spot price collusion in 
digital systems.10 Data-driven, machine-learning systems could be biased by 
their input data and thus could allow firms to engage in automated price 
collusion without any direct communication between firms. In this way, the 
use of machine learning algorithms for key business processes without 
regulation or inspection of the underlying data can create (or obfuscate) 
. This has already been 
academic work on strategies for detecting some AI-enabled collusion.11  
B.  Advertisement-supported Content 
The previous discussion centered around content that consumers pay for 
directly. But a large portion of media is financially supported, at least in part, 
by advertisements. It has been well-established for some years now that 
certain meta-data on a population can allow firms to produce highly-targeted, 
effective marketing materials.12 It is perhaps less well-known that media 
companies have been developing algorithms to assess the emotional impact 
of the content they produce.13 As is often the case in developing machine 
 
10 Severin Borenstein, Rapid Price Communications and Coordination: The Airline Tariff 
Publishing Case (1994), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 236 
(J.E. Kwoka & L.J. White eds., 1999). 
11 See generally Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When 
Computers Inhibit Competition, 5 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1775 (2017). 
12 See Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, 
FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-
figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/. 
13 Contextual Moments, 4SALES, https://www.4sales.com/contextual-moments (last visited April 
20, 2020). Your author personally knew the executive managing the project. 
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learning models, the issue or opportunity here is not in the existence of these 
two particular datasets, but their combination. If meta-
behavior while watching a piece of content
their facial expression, as well as what portions of the content they find most 
engrossing can be combined with data on the emotional impact of the 
a specific product. For example, meta-data from one source could suggest, 
via an algorithm
parent had a fondness for a particular vehicle. While the same person watches 
a piece of content, an algorithm observes that they are particularly engrossed 
and open to persuasion, so the content is interrupted for an advertisement of 
that same vehicle. This example might be far-fetched or distasteful, but it 
illustrates what could be achieved for advertisers, and more importantly, 
illustrates the issues around data. Society takes the view that the vulnerable 
should be protected from manipulation or predatory trade practices, yet it is 
not clear how existing laws and data protection regulations could be used to 
prevent persons from being emotionally manipulated by content. This issue 
becomes more fraught when one considers algorithm-generated content. 
 
IV.  WHAT IF CONTENT PRODUCED BY AI AND DEEP LEARNING 
ALGORITHMS BECOME THE NORM? 
This scenario is much more speculative than the last. So, let us begin by 
establishing that the principles of it are very much reality and not science 
fiction. 14 The reader is no doubt aware that deep learning algorithms are able 
to generate photo-realistic videos, superimpose faces from still images onto 
videos of other people, and use those same still photos to create videos of the 
subject moving and talking. We have also seen this technology used to re-
create the appearances of deceased actors as their younger selves in modern 
cinema15 It should also be noted that other deep learning algorithms have 
demonstrated the capability to re-create written words that closely match the 
tone of a particular author or speaker. For instance, if your author used the 
in the following text: 
 
14 THIS PERSON DOES NOT EXIST, https://www.thispersondoesnotexist.com/ (last visited April 20, 
2020). These photographs were generated by an algorithm and do not 
represent real human beings. 
15 See Rebecca Hawkes, From Rogue One s Peter Cushing to Audrey Hepburn: 6 Stars Who Were 
Digitally Brought Back to Life, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 20, 2016, 7:20 PM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/films/0/rogue-ones-peter-cushing-audrey-hepburn-stars-digitally-brought/. 
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what t
One can imagine using them for voice recognition systems 
to identify human speech. Or for example, using neural 
networks to determine how to make a face from different 
images or a word from one language to another. However, 
there are two ways that these deep learning algorithms can 
go wrong. One is that they can end up generating random 
noise.16 
Further, we have already discussed how film and television content must 
go through a risk-averse greenlighting process. Since talented actors have a 
loyal audience for which data can be gathered, it is not hard to conclude that 
a greenlight process would favor content with established talent. Let us 
imagine a world where algorithms could recreate their likeness in arbitrary 
roles. The likeness of a particular actor would be a valuable piece of 
Intellectual Property (as, indeed, it is today). But it is less clear what would 
instance, if producers found that the personality of a particular comedian was 
popular (or favorable to the greenlighting algorithms discussed previously), 
they could use a text generation algorithm such as the one demonstrated to 
ersonality and use a video-
generation algorithm to create a video of a non-existent person (who 
resembles the original comedian) delivering the text. They could, in effect, 
capture the personality of an actor and use it to generate new original content. 
If 
reproduced, then they may seek to protect it, and that would require 
expanding copyright to include personality and other social skills. We have 
already seen the beginnings of such copyright issues in the music industry in 
a recent music copyright case involving a Katy Perry song, Dark Horse. The 
even content generated by random algorithms (never mind intelligent 
algorithms) could be protected by copyright.17  
With new concepts of copyright and intellectual property come new 
possibilities to infringe. Consider if an algorithm were to create the likeness 
of a non-existent person (like those people pictured above), and that non-
existent person resembled closely enough an existing actor (or even another 
 
16 See Alec Radford et al., Language Models Are Unsupervised Multitask Learners, OPENAI 
(2019), https://cdn.openai.com/better-language-
models/language_models_are_unsupervised_multitask_learners.pdf. This was implemented at TALK TO 
TRANSFORMER, https://talktotransformer.com/. Your author took the first suggestion and did not edit it.  
17 Mark Savage, Katy Perry Wins Reversal of Dark Horse Plagiarism Verdict, BBC NEWS (March 
28, 2020), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-51942894. 
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non-existent person generated by an algorithm that has already been used in 
revenue-generating content) that its owners could reap the benefits of the 
n base, would this constitute a violation of intellectual property 
rights? If generated, non-existent people were to become commonplace or if 
generated item is at risk of a violation. As discussed at the start of this paper, 
the algorithms that generate these non-existent persons are a direct product 
of the data used to train them. Presumably, this data would be past revenue-
generating content. Therefore, one would expect that these algorithms would 
generate similar non-existent persons. This could evolve into a scenario 
where firms accumulate the intellectual property associated with valuable 
actors, et cetera, in much the same was as tech companies accumulate patents: 
as a method of mutually assured destruction.18 So, agencies that represent 
talent would compete to acquire as much intellectual property for as many 
persons as they could so they would always have a strong offensive strategy 
if they ever accidentally infringed. Indeed, hidden in that last sentence was 
the idea that talent agencies would be representing intellectual property
whether it is the likeness of a real person or not or even algorithms 
 that is, original revenue-generating content. A firm that held a large 
back catalog of films and television series would have a significantly easier 
time producing new content just from that data. This again highlights the 
principle of data accumulating into a handful of firms and denying other firms 
the possibility to compete. 
V.  CLOSING REMARKS 
This paper began with three principles of how data pertains to 
competition, and these examples were meant to illustrate how those same 
principles apply to the film and entertainment industries. Some of these issues 
around data and competition could be addressed, naively, by forcing large 
firms to share data sets with smaller firms. This would create an entirely 
different set of risks, especially around violating c
 
18 Wendy Seltzer, Software Patents and/or Software Development, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 929, 933
934 (2013). In particular,  
When Google announced its agreement a few weeks later to acquire Motorola Mobility Inc. for 
$12.5 billion, the acquisition of a major mobile hardware manufacturer was widely read as a 
mobile operating system. . . From a strategic perspective, there were plenty of reasons for Google 
not to enter the hardware business, but it apparently became clear that without patents to counter-
assert against patent attackers, Android would lose the confidence of other hardware makers and 
fail. 
Id. 
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Indeed, most consumer data protection attempts to restrict firms from sharing 
with third parties without the consent of the data subject. Yet deep learning 
whereby a deep learning algorithm is trained a primary data set for a general 
task (e.g., identifying which part of a photograph is in the focus of a camera), 
and then the trained-algorithm is re-trained on a smaller, more specific data 
set for a more precise use case (e.g., identifying a face in a photograph). As 
the trained model is, in essence, a long list of numbers, this could be shared 
with minimal risk to data subjects. Many deep learning practitioners already 
share models this way.19 
It is also worth keeping a healthy sense of skepticism with these 
examples. While they were certainly not exhaustive, they were hypothetical 
and quite speculative; many of these issues may never arise. Machine 
learning, big data, et cetera has an extraordinary capacity to both be 
frighteningly effective while at the same time quite underwhelming. For 
instance, a firm your author helped start, Gower Street Analytics, was 
credited with using its advanced datasets and algorithms to pick the release 
st film. The chosen date for the said political 
documentary was a September date six weeks before an election. Arguably a 
film industry veteran could have made that call without computer assistance. 
Finally, it is generally thought that the purpose of competition law is to 
ensure consumers have choice (in price, quality, et cetera).20 The earlier 
example of emotional advertising was meant to highlight that some potential 
data abuses go behind protecting consumers. Competition law is so 
intertwined with politics because it is about regulating power. The data firms 
collect on consumers, audiences, or others gives them the power to influence 
consumer behavior and public opinion as well as the market. However 
skeptical one might be about the business value of machine learning, it is 
increasingly important to consider how to effectively regulate it. 
 
 
19 See Sinno Jialin Pan & Qiang Yang, A Survey on Transfer Learning, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS 
ON KNOWLEDGE & DATA ENGINEERING 1345, 1345 (2010). 
20 See generally Paul H. Brietzke, Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, 
13 VAL. U. L. REV. 403 (1979). 
